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TORT LAW-Either the Parents or the Child May Claim
Compensation for the Child's Medical and Non-Medical
Damages:
Lopez v. Southwest Community Health Services
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lopez v. Southwest Community Health Services,' the New Mexico
Court of Appeals decided for the first time that a minor can recover
for her or his own future medical and non-medical expenses. 2 The court
found no legitimate reason why recovery for medical damages should
belong only to the parent, as long as the tortfeasors are protected against
double recovery. 3 In tort cases decided prior to Lopez, minor plaintiffs
apparently did not recover damages in their own capacity; instead their
future medical expenses were awarded to their parents who are legally
responsible for payment of those expenses.4 The Lopez decision did not
eliminate the role of the parents; instead Lopez allows either the parent
or the child to sue and recover the damage award.5 While the court also
wrote on three other issues, 6 this casenote focuses on the implications
for attorneys of the court's ruling that either the minor or a parent may
sue for the child's future medical expenses.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Rudy and Dorothy Lopez, parents of Adam Lopez, brought a medical
malpractice action in their representative capacity against Southwest Community Health Services and the physician who delivered their son. Neither
Dorothy nor Rudy Lopez asserted any claims on their own behalf; instead
they participated in the lawsuit as representatives of their son. 7 The claim
1. 114 N.M. 2, 833 P.2d 1183, cert. denied, 831 P.2d 989 (1992).
2. Adam Lopez as a minor has a right to recover damages for medical, custodial and related
expenses. Id. at 4, 833 P.2d at 1185. Presumably, also, Adam can recover for lost earning capacity
and pain and suffering. See Collins v. Perrine, 108 N.M. 714, 720, 778 P.2d 912, 918 (Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 681, 777 P.2d 1325 (1989) (the court awarded the injured minor
through his parents damages for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and shortened life
opportunity).
3. Lopez, 114 N.M. at 4, 833 P.2d at 1185.
4. See e.g., Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 393, 806 P.2d 40, 42 (1991); Walters v. Hastings,
84 N.M. 101, 500 P.2d 186 (1972).
5. Lopez, 114 N.M. at 11, 833 P.2d at 1192.
6. First, the court affirmed the jury finding that the conduct of the defendant Hospital was
a proximate cause of the physician's decision to deliver Adam which ultimately lead to his present
condition. Id. at 5-7, 833 P.2d at 1186-88. Second, the court found that allegedly inflammatory
remarks made by the plaintiff's counsel in closing argument, while "forceful to the extreme" did
not create excessive prejudice toward the jury or violate any ethical considerations so as to require
reversal of the verdict. Id. at 7-10, 833 P.2d at 1188-91. Last, the court upheld the trial court's
ruling that evidence regarding an individual's insurance liability in a negligence case may be admissible
if counsel is attempting to show the bias or prejudice of a witness. Id. at 12-13, 833 P.2d at 119394.
7. Id. at 114, 833 P.2d at 1185.
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stemmed from the premature birth of Adam, which left him with severe
physical and mental disabilities.'
The jury found both defendants liable, allocating seventy percent of
the fault to the physician and thirty percent to the hospital, and awarding
Adam $1.25 million for future medical expenses and $1 million for future
non-medical expenses. 9 The hospital was liable for thirty percent of those
amounts. 10
On appeal, the hospital asserted that as a matter of law, Adam Lopez
could not recover for his own medical expenses because they are the
legal responsibility of his parents. The court of appeals rejected the
hospital's argument. The court held that a minor does have the right to
recover her own medical expenses as long as there is no double recovery
from the defendant."
III.

ANALYSIS

After Lopez, in New Mexico, either a parent or a child can sue for
a cause of action to recover a minor's future medical and non-medical
expenses stemming from a tort claim.' 2 This rule is not new to Indiana
or California, two jurisdictions Lopez relied upon to support its holding.
In Indiana, the defendant in Scott County School District 1 v. Asher,'3
objected at trial to a jury instruction that allowed the minor plaintiff
the right to recover his own medical expenses.' 4 The objection was
overruled by the trial judge. The issue on appeal was whether a minor
can recover for his medical expenses resulting from injuries caused by
defendant's negligence. 5 The court held that either the parents or the
child may recover for the child's medical bills, reasoning that parents
of a minor can sue for the child's medical expenses because they have
a legal obligation to provide the necessary and reasonable medical services
to a child.' 6 The court stated, "Itihe parent is ... liable because of his
common law and, in some instances, statutory duty to support and
maintain his child.' ' 7 However, the court did not limit the ability to sue
to the child's parents. The court affirmed the trial court ruling allowing
the minor to recover his future medical expenses in his own name, noting
that the minor child is also liable for medical expenses because those
expenses are "necessaries" for which even an infant is personally liable.' 8

8. Adam Lopez was born at least nine weeks premature. Id. Due to the risks of delivering a
premature baby, Adam was born a quadriplegic, deaf, blind, mute, subject to seizures, and has a
shunt in his head. Id. at 6, 833 P.2d at 1187.
9. Id.
10. Id. Both defendants appealed. However, the Lopez family settled with the physician. The
court decision only addresses the issues raised by the Hospital.
11. Id. at 4, 833 P.2d at 1185.
12. Id. at 10, 833 P.2d at 1191.
13. 324 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 1975).
14. Id. at 498.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 499.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 497.
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Therefore, it follows that "both parent and child are liable upon suit
by the doctor or the hospital, and consequently either may be compensated
for the reasonable value of medical expenses."' 9 Since both the parents
and the child are liable for future medical expenses, Scott held that either
the parents or the child can sue for medical damages and divide the
they want so long as the defendant does not pay the
proceeds however
20
plaintiffs twice.
Lopez also cites three California cases in support of its conclusion
that the minor can sue for her own medical expenses. In White v. Moreno
Valley Unified School District,2' the minor, through her father as guardian
ad litem, and her mother filed a complaint in which both sought damages
against the Moreno Valley School District. 22 The complaint specified one
cause of action for the minor plaintiff for medical and future medical
expenses, and a separate cause of action for plaintiff's mother for recovery
of medical and incidental expenses incurred and to be incurred in the
future as a result of her daughter's injury. 23 When the child reached
majority during the pendency of the proceedings, the complaint was
amended to delete the father as guardian ad litem and the mother
voluntarily deleted her cause of action for medical expenses, leaving only
the daughter as the claimant. 24 At trial, the court granted the defendant's
motion to exclude all evidence of the amount of medical expenses incurred
to the time of trial because the bills had all been paid by plaintiff's
mother. 25 The court of appeals rejected the contention that since the
mother incurred the medical expenses and paid the bills, the right of
action to recover this loss was hers and not the plaintiffs. 26 Instead the
court concluded that the trial court was wrong to exclude the evidence
of the child's medical expenses, and the child's claim was sufficient to
support her own cause of action for medical expenses. 27 Ultimately, the
court held that a cause of action to recover for a minor's medical expenses
belongs to both the parents and 2the child and they become co-owners
of the right of action to recover. 1

19. Id. at 499.
20. Id.
21. 226 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1986).
22. Id. at 744.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 745. "The court's ruling was based on its conclusion that the tort claim presented
to School District on behalf of plaintiff did not include any claim on her part for medical expenses;
that, on the contrary, in the claim that was presented only plaintiff's mother claimed medical expense
damages; and that in fact the mother's claim was included in the complaint filed against the School
District but the mother's cause of action was subsequently voluntarily dismissed."
26. Id.
27. Id.at 748.
28. Id. at 746; see also Lopez, 114 N.M. at 11, 833 P.2d at 1192.
The White court based its opinion on an earlier California case, Bauman v. San Francisco, 108
P.2d 989 (Cal. App. 1940). Bauman stressed that where the injured child is living with his or her
parents, and they are the primary care takers of the child, then it follows that the expenses incurred
to care for the child rest with the parents and not the minor. Bauman also provides that this rule
is not without exception. The child is also allowed to recover for the reasonable value of the medical
expenses. Id.at 999.
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In Wiley v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,29 a minor plaintiff,
through his guardian ad litem, filed a complaint against the defendant
for damages resulting from an injury he received while climbing on
defendant's train.30 The plaintiff's father did not file a separate claim
to recover any damages or medical expenses. The jury found against the
defendant and assessed its negligence at twenty-five percent and the
plaintiff's comparative negligence at seventy-five percent. The jury awarded
the plaintiff $54,000 for medical expenses. 3 The jury did not reduce the
medical expenses award by the percentage of plaintiff's comparative
fault.3 2 The defendant contended that since the complaint was only brought
by the minor, the award of medical expenses should have been reduced
by the percentage of damages attributable to his negligence. The court
of appeals agreed, and ordered a new trial with instructions that the
judgment for plaintiff's medical expenses be apportioned according to
the percentage of comparative negligence of the child. 33
The court saw no issue regarding the parents' right to recover for the
medical expenses since the cause of action was clearly asserted as the
minor plaintiff's right to recover his own medical expenses. Wiley affirmed
the law in California that an injured minor can recover her or his own
medical expenses.3 4 The court stated that, "[bloth a minor and his or
her parents have standing to sue for the child's medical expenses resulting
from a defendant's tortious conduct." 3 The court acknowledged that the
parents and6 the child have a joint right to bring a lawsuit against the
3
defendant.
Finally, in Anisodon v. Superior Court3 7 the minor, through her mother
as guardian ad litem, alleged her own cause of action for medical
malpractice.3 8 Plaintiff's mother also asserted a cause of action on her
own behalf. The mother's claim sought recovery for the mother's emotional distress as a result of the negligently performed delivery of her
daughter. 3 9 The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrers and found
that the mother could not recover emotional distress damages.4 The court
of appeals overturned the decision not to award damages for distress
and allowed the mother her own cause of action for negligent infliction

29. 269 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1990).
30. Id. at 245.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 249. In appropriating fault, seventy-five percent went to the minor plaintiff. Before
apportionment, the jury awarded the child $125,000 and $53,366 for medical expenses. The court
entered a judgment for $84,616 by subtracting seventy-five percent fault from the $125,000 to get
$31,250, and then added $53,366 for medical expenses.
33. Id. at 249-50.
34. Id.at 249.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 285 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 819 P.2d 842 (Cal. 1991).
38. Id. at 541.
39. Id. The father also alleged his own complaint of negligent infliction of emotional distress
even though he was not a patient of the physician.
40. Id. at 542. The court's reasoning was based on the lack of contemporaneous perception
observed by the parents to the injury.

Spring 1993]

TORT LA W

of emotional distress. 4' The court reasoned that the minor can sue on

her own behalf and recover medical expenses so long as the minor and
her parents do not recover the same expenses and recover twice from
the defendant. 42 Accordingly, the court stated that the cause of action
4 3
to recover medical expenses belongs to both the parents and the child .

The minor plaintiff had asserted her own cause of action for medical
expenses and loss of earning capacity, but this did not deprive the mother
of her separate claim for her emotional distress since the combination
of the claims would not lead to double recovery for the child's medical
expenses.44
From these precedents, the Lopez court concluded that a claim for
medical expenses can be brought by either the parent or the child. The
court acknowledged that double recovery would be improper, however,
and ruled that the parents are barred from recovering from the defendant
the expenses incurred by the minor if the minor has already recovered

for those expenses. 45 The court decided that, so long as the defendant

is protected against double recovery, either a minor or a parent should
be able to recover medical expenses." Furthermore, since a parent acting

as a guardian or next friend can waive the right 47 to sue for the recovery

of the child's medical expenses, whenever the parent, as guardian ad
litem sues for medical expenses on behalf of the child, the judgment
awarded to the minor is a bar to any subsequent action by the parent
to recover the same items or losses.
IV.

DISCUSSION

At first glance, the court's ruling that either a parent or a minor can
sue to recover the minor's medical and other expenses in a tort action
seems relatively unimportant. The hospital raised the issue in an attempt
to reverse the damage award given to Adam Lopez, only in response to
plaintiff's counsel's stated intention to file a separate lawsuit to recover
damages for the parents of Adam Lopez.4 In response, the court of

41. Id. at 550.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 547 (citing White v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 226 Cal. Rptr. 742, 746 (Cal.
App. 1986)).
44. Anisodon, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
45. Lopez, 114 N.M. at 11, 833 P.2d at 1192.
46. Id.
47. Lopez "...
agree[s] with California's . .. rule providing that the right to recover a minor's
medical expenses belongs to the parent but can be waived in favor of the minor." Lopez, 114
N.M. at 11, 833 P.2d at 1192. Furthermore, Lopez emphasized that the issue of waiver should
only arise if the parent also seeks to recover the minor's medical expenses. Id. If so, the parent
has then waived the right to recover the medical expenses and will be estopped from seeking double
recovery. Id. at 11-12, 833 P.2d at 1192-93.
48. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 21-22, Lopez v. Southwest Community Health Services, 114
N.M. 2, 833 P.2d 1183 (1992), cert. denied, 831 P.2d 989 (1992). The hospital-defendant asserted
that the traditional rule that parents recover for medical expenses is the better rule, especially since
plaintiff's counsel advised defendant's counsel of his intent to file a separate lawsuit on behalf of
Mr. and Mrs. Lopez for recovery of damages. The basis for a separate lawsuit for the parents is
unclear. Perhaps they were contemplating a suit for their emotional distress. See Ramirez v.
Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246 (1990).
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appeals rejected defendant's argument that minors are not allowed to
sue for medical expenses just because the expenses are the legal responsibility of the parents. 49 Since the hospital will be protected against double
recovery, the court saw no reason to limit a recovery of medical damages
only to Adam's parents, especially when the caption of the lawsuit clearly
identified Adam Lopez as the claimant. 50 Nevertheless, Lopez is significant
to attorneys who represent both the minor and the parents. The freedom
to assign the claim for medical expenses to either the parents or the
child presents important new choices and tactical considerations unavailable to attorneys prior to Lopez.5
Statute of Limitations Ramifications
Lopez impacts three New Mexico statutes of limitation in personal
injury cases.5 2 Each provision grants a minor more time than an adult
to initiate a claim. 53 After Lopez, the attorney can either sue for the
minor's medical expenses in the name of the parents and commence an
action within the normal limitation period, or wait, allow the injuries
to fully manifest themselves over time, and then file suit on behalf of
the child for medical and other expenses, using the extended limitation
period provided for minors' lawsuits. 4 This choice was not
available prior to Lopez because the claim for medical expenses was
thought to reside solely. with the parents.

A.

Post-Majority Recovery Issues
Lopez raises a question regarding how long parents can recover for
future medical expenses. The reason for permitting parental recovery is
that parents are liable for the medical expenses of children. 5 Their
B.

49. Lopez, 114 N.M. at 10, 833 P.2d at 1191.
50. Id. at 2, 833 P.2d at 1183.
51. New Mexico's principles of comparative negligence and several liability preclude any tactical
advantages that one might seek to obtain by assigning the claim to, for example, the innocent child
instead of to a parent who was guilty of some negligence in the transaction. Even when the claim
is pursued by the innocent minor, the parent's negligence will reduce the verdict for the minor by
the percentage of the fault attributable to the parent. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-1 (Repl. Pamp.
1989); Collins v. Tabet, Ill N.M. 391, 394, 806 P.2d 40, 43 (1991) (child's recovery for medical
expenses was reduced by seven percent to reflect the father's comparative negligence).
52. The three statutes of limitation are: (a) general personal injury, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-18 (Repl. Pamp. 1990); (b) Medical Malpractice Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (Repl. Pamp.
1989); and (c) Tort Claims Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
53. Under the general personal injury statute of limitation, an adult suing for personal injury
has three years to commence an action, while minors are given one year after the age of majority
to bring a claim. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). The purpose for the different
standard is to allow the minor an opportunity to act for himself or herself after minority has been
removed. Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 468 P.2d 627 (1970). Under the Medical Malpractice Act,
an adult has three years to sue and a minor under the age of six has until his ninth birthday to
file a personal injury claim. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). Finally, the Tort
Claims Act permits an adult two years to file, and a minor under the age of seven until his ninth
birthday to file a personal injury claim. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
54. If the attorney decides to wait to see how the child's injury develops, however, she may
confront difficulty proving her prima facie case.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.

Spring 1993]

TORT LA W

obligation normally ends when the child reaches age 18.56 Future medical
expenses, therefore, should be awarded to parents only for expenses to
be incurred until the child has reached majority.57 Post-majority medical
expenses, therefore, belong only to the child and should not be awarded
to parents. This provides plaintiff's counsel with a compelling reason to
sue for at least post-majority medical expenses in the name of the child.
There is, however, one exception to this general rule that parental
rights and responsibilities are severed when the child reaches majority.
If a child who reaches majority is incapable of caring for herself, her
parents are then bound by law to continue supporting the child.58 For
example, since Adam Lopez is permanently incapacitated, his parents will
be legally required to support him after the age of eighteen. It follows
that all the medical expenses to be incurred on behalf of Adam Lopez
could be recovered by his parents in a suit brought to recover for
themselves the future medical expenses of Adam.
Where, as in the case of Adam Lopez, it is virtually certain that the
child will be disabled past the age of majority, there is no difficulty in
assigning to the parents the claim for all future medical expenses. The
parents, liable for a lifetime of medical expenses, have standing to sue
in their own names for all those expenses. When, in contrast, the child
will not be disabled at majority but will incur post-majority medical
expenses, problems do arise unless the child sues in her own name for
all of the future medical bills. The parents can only sue in their name
for pre-majority expenses because they are liable for nothing more. The
child will have to file a claim on her own behalf to recover compensation
for post-majority expenses because only the child and not the parents
will be legally responsible for them. This bifurcation of the claim into
separate pre-and post-majority units creates an additional factual issue
for jury resolution. The jury must decide how much of the future medical
bills are attributable to pre-majority expenses and thus compensable to
the parents, and how much was to be awarded to the child for postmajority expenses. To avoid this problem, the attorney should sue for
all future medical expenses in the name of the child alone when it is
likely that the child will not be disabled at majority but will incur postmajority medical expenses.

56. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-6-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (person at the age of eighteen is an
adult).
57. See Lovelace Medical Ctr. v. Mendez, Ill N.M. 336, 344-45, 805 P.2d 603, 611-12 (1991)
(citing Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1990)). The court held that Lovelace's
negligence- failure to properly perform plaintiff's sterilization operation-was an invasion that entitled
the plaintiff to recover damages up to the child's majority.
58. Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 776, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (1967). This exception applies
"where there is infirmity of body or mind rendering the child unable to take care of itself [sic]
and requiring the child to remain with the parent." Gillikin v. Burbage, 139 S.E.2d 753, 758 (N.C.
1965). See also Parker v. Parker, 94 S.E.2d 12, 13 (S.C. 1956) (absent any disorder, illness or
sickness where the child is unable to take care for herself, emancipation of the child begins at
majority). See generally Peer v. City of Newark, 176 A.2d 249, 261 (N.J. 1961) (future medical
bills should be awarded to parents "perhaps even after [majority] if the young man should not be
restored to health and should be dependent upon his father for aid").
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Assuring that the Proceeds Will be Available to Pay Future
Medical Expenses
When the child sues in her own name for medical expenses, the recovery
is hers, not her parents. Because the child is a minor and thus unable
to manage the proceeds herself, the plaintiff's attorney should appoint
C.

a conservator,

9

create a trust, 60 or take other steps to assure that the

proceeds are properly managed and used for their designated purpose.
This process also will protect the recovery from creditors of the parents.
In contrast, if the attorney assigns the claim for medical expenses to
the parents, the proceeds will belong to the parents and not the child.
The New York Court of Appeals 6' has described the potential unfortunate
consequences that flow from a parental recovery of sums for future
medical expenses or increased care and maintenance of the child:
He [the parent] can do with it as he sees fit. He can will it away,
or if he dies without a will, it becomes part of the estate. In either
case, the infant might receive little or no benefit from it. The natural
to properly support his infant children does not
instinct of a parent
62
always prevail.
Attorneys representing plaintiffs suing for injuries to minors should
not assume that parents will put the money aside and use it only for
their child's medical care. Parents might spend it other things or they
may get into financial difficulty and creditors of the parents may look
to the proceeds of the litigation to satisfy parental debts not related to
the child's medical care. 63 If the parents die intestate the child is assured

59. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-401 (Repl. Pamp. 1989) a conservator may be appointed
upon a petition to the court. The court will appoint a conservator to oversee the affairs of a minor
if the court finds that the minor's property requires management or protection which cannot otherwise
be provided, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-401(A)(1); if the minor's business affairs are "jeopardized
or prevented by his majority," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-401(A)(2); or "funds are needed for a
minor's support and education and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide
funds," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-401(A)(3). Any person interested in the minor's estate can be
appointed as a conservator including a parent, guardian or custodian. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5404(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
60. To create a trust for the child, the trial judge may order the defendants to transfer the
minor's medical expenses and non-medical expenses (pain and suffering and lost earning capacity)
into the court account until the representative for the minor comes forward with proof that he or
she has established a trust fund in the minor's name which will adequately protect the child's
interests. Moreover, the court may require court approval for withdrawals made from the trust.
This approach has been followed in Kansas where the parents recovered damages on behalf of their
child's tort claim. In Arche v. United States Dep't of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 486 (Kan. 1990), the
court recognized the concern of the possible "unjust use of any damage award received by parents
in a wrongful birth case." Id. The court noted that concerns of misuse by parents of a child's
damage award could be avoided if the money was secured in trust. Id. Arche stated, "[bloth parties
agreed money would be placed in trust and money disbursed as needed to pay for the costs of the
child's care." Id. at 487 (noting Robak v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) which also suggested the establishment of a
trust for the payment of an award for a child's wrongful birth).
61. Clarke v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 144 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1924).
62. Id.at 517-18.
63. If the parents set up a trust in the child's name then creditors would be prohibited from
acquiring any of the trust property. "[Clreditors have no rights or remedies as far as the trust
property [is concerned]." GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 227 (2d ed. 1979).
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to receive a portion of the moneys remaining from the litigation, but
other heirs may also receive some of the damages which were supposed
to pay for the child's medical expenses. To avoid these problems, the
plaintiff's attorney should consider pleading the claim for future medical
expenses as a part of the child's cause of action rather than that of the
parents. In addition, plaintiff's attorney should also ensure that the
proceeds are set apart from the assets of the parents and a reasonable
amount of the damage award is specifically designated to the64 minor and
used for expenses related to medical and non-medical care.
There is one situation, however, where it is proper for the parents to
recover medical expenses in their own name. This is appropriate where
the parents have already spent money for the child's medical care before
damages were awarded. In such cases, it is fitting to allow them to collect
for already incurred and paid medical expenses. In New York, for example,
the court decided that the father was allowed to recover for paid past
medical expenses.6 5 The plaintiff's attorney in New Mexico can and should
reserve for the parents the claim for past paid medical bills.
There is precedent, however, for granting the child even the claim for
past medical expenses already incurred and paid for by the parents. In
an early California case, Aubel v. Sosso, 66 the court held that a child
living under the care of his parents may recover for the medical expenses
already paid by the father.6 7 The court found no reason why the child
his own medical
should not be responsible for and thus entitled to recover
68
expenses, even those paid previously by his parents.
Maximizing Recovery Under the Tort Claims Act
Lopez may impact plaintiffs' recovery under the pre-1992 version of
the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act).6 9 In an attempt to maximize the
amount recoverable under the Act, the attorney may decide to allocate
the claim for future medical expenses to either the parent or the child70
in such a way as to avoid the cap on recovery for "any [one] person."
For example, the minor can recover a maximum of only $300,000 even
if her future medical bills are in excess of this amount. The Act also
allows maximum recovery of $500,000 for "all claims" arising out of a
single occurrence, 71 thereby giving other persons, such as the parents, an
D.

64. See supra notes 59-60 for a discussion of how a conservator might be appointed or a trust
fund established for the child.
65. Clarke v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 144 N.E. 516, 517 (N.Y. 1924).
66. 236 P. 319 (Cal. 1925).
67. Id. at 321; see also White v. Moreno Valley Sch. Dist., 226 Cal. Rptr. 742 (Cal. App.
1986).
68. Id. at 321. The court said, "[i]f the contract for such necessities [medical expenses] on the
part of the minor is valid the fact that the obligation has been met by advancements on the part
of the parent prior to the trial of the case is no defense to the recovery of special damages .
The court did not discuss the issue of double recovery.
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 to § 41-4-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) of the Tort Claims Act places a cap of
$300,000 "to any one person."
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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opportunity to recover when the child's claim is capped at $300,000.
Plaintiff's attorney could assign to the parents all future medical expenses
when the child's recovery for pain and suffering and lost earning capacity
exceeds the cap. Arguably the parents, as co-plaintiffs with their own
claim for future medical expenses for the child could recover a separate
award of $200,000 under the Act. In this way parents and child could
72
receive $500,000 for injuries to the child arising from a single occurrence.
The cap provisions of the Act were amended, effective July 1, 1992. 71
The new provisions
are worded differently and may preclude this strategy
74
from working.
V.

ETHICAL ISSUES FOR PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY

Lopez illustrates that an attorney employed by parents to recover
damages for their child's injury has two clients-the parents and the
child. The attorney must allocate damage claims between the parents and
the child when filing the complaint. Some choices will be easy. The child
possesses the right to recover for the child's pain and suffering and lost
earning capacity. The parents have the right to recover for past medical
expenses paid by them on behalf of the child75 and any damages caused
by negligent infliction of emotional distress to the parents. 76 More difficult,
after Lopez, is the assignment of the claim for future medical expenses
of the child. That claim can now be pursued by either the parents or
the child. The lawyer who must choose whether to plead the claim as
that of the parents or the child may well confront ethical problems in
making that choice.

72. The possibilities for maximizing recovery extend beyond just the Tort Claims Act. Personal
auto insurance policies generally operate under the same guidelines. If the personal auto insurance
policy has an express inclusion of liability coverage for family members and friends, then a minor
and his or her parents could maximize their recover similar to the analysis found under the Tort
Claims Act. However, many personal auto insurance policies have exclusion clauses that exclude
certain persons or classes of persons from recovery under the insurance. For example, policies often
state that the liability insurance "does not apply to bodily injury to any insured or any member
of the family or an insured residing in the same household as the insured." See ROBERT E. KEETON
& ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE FOR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES,
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 4.9(c), at 392-95 (1988). "Provisions which exclude coverage for

family members, and in some instances friends as well, were designed with a view to protecting
insurers from collusive suits." Id. at 393. Exclusion policies have been the subject of much criticism,
and jurisdictions have found the family member exclusion clauses against public policy and invalid.
Id. at 394-95.
73. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
74. The Act as amended caps damages at $300,000 for all past and future medical expenses
without including language that refers "to anylone] person." See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Cum.
Supp. 1992). The exclusion of "any[onel person" suggests that both parents and child may not be
able to recover for the child's injuries under the Act to maximize their recovery. The provision as
it reads in the Act's amended version only applies to a single occurrence.
75. See supra note 61 for a discussion on allowing the parents recovery for past paid medical
expenses.
76. See supra note 48 for a discussion on potential parental recovery under negligent infliction
of emotional distress.
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Parents have a right to believe that the decision of who recovers future
medical expenses rests with them. 77 However, the attorney may believe
that it is her duty to ensure that both the parents and the child receive
a fair outcome. If the parents choose to give the cause of action to the
child, then no conflict will arise between the attorney and the parents.
If, on the other hand, the parents want to the keep the cause of action
for future medical expenses and the attorney recognizes that this decision
may be detrimental to the interests of child, then the attorney faces a
conflict of interest. 78 The interests of the attorney and the parents are
now in opposition because the attorney does not believe that the parents'
decision to keep the claim for future79 medical expenses is in the best
interest of her other client, the child.
When faced with a conflict between clients, an attorney can only
represent both if she believes the representation of one will not harm
the relationship with the other.8 0 It is fair to conclude that the attorney's
opposition to the parents' decision to keep the cause of action for future
medical expenses is a conflict that will adversely affect their attorneyclient relationship. To continue to represent both the parents and the
child in the presence of this conflict, the attorney needs consent from
both clients.8 ' An infant is unable to give consent to the dual representation, and there lies a dilemma.
The attorney has three available options to solve this problem. If the
attorney cannot strike a compromise with the parents or if the attorney
decides the parents' decision is just plain wrong, then she can withdraw
from the case. To withdraw the attorney is required to show that her
client insisted upon pursuing a goal which the attorney found "repugnant"
or "imprudent.' '82 Second, the attorney can choose to represent the child

77. See N.M. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16-102(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991). The

rule states that "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation
... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."
78. See N.M. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16-107 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).

A. A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the client will be
directly or substantially adverse to another client; unless:
(1)the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation ....
B. . . . A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's representation to another client or to a
third person ....
Id.
79. The interests between the attorney and the parent may diverge if the attorney understands
that the parents will not spend the money to pay for their child's medical care, but instead use
the money for other purposes. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
80. See N.M. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at 16-107(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
81. See N.M. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at 16-107(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
82. See N.M. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16-116(B)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1991).

Rule 16-116(B) states that it is permissible for an attorney to withdraw from representing a client
if it will not harm the interests of the client or if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that
the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." Id. at 16-116(B)(3). If the attorney withdraws from
the case, she will realize that the parents are entitled to hire another attorney and create the same
situation over again. Under Model Rule 16-106 (Confidentiality of information) the attorney is
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and risk the probability that the parents will discharge the attorney and
take the case somewhere else.83 The parents may be able to discharge
the attorney who was to represent the child if it was clear at the beginning
of the relationship that the minor was under the direction and authority
of the parents. 84 This would leave the principal attorney without either
client.
Last, if the attorney decides that the best alternative is to remain as
counsel for the parents, then consideration must be given to finding legal
representation for the child. In determining who shall represent the child,
the attorney has two alternatives. She can either ask the court to appoint
a guardian ad litem,83 or she can arrange for the child to obtain a private
attorney.
The possible dilemma that plaintiffs' counsel faces after Lopez is
analogous to one confronted by plaintiffs' counsel in Collins ex rel.
Collins v. Tabet. 86 Mr. and Mrs. Collins brought action against the
guardian ad litem appointed for their son for damages for alleged malpractice in settling a medical malpractice suit. 81 The Collinses initially
retained an attorney to pursue a medical malpractice claim against tortfeasors who failed to diagnose their child's spinal meningitis. A settlement
agreement was reached and during this process the Collinses' attorney
88
agreed that a guardian ad litem should be appointed for their child.

barred from revealing any information relating to the representation of the clients without their
consent. The attorney would be unable to discuss with the second counsel the reasons why the
conflict arose because it is privileged information.
83. If the circumstances were such that the attorney continued to represent only the child, she
should not fear potential sanctions from the parents because her conduct is protected under the
New Mexico Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See N.M. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 16-116 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). The rule allows an attorney to terminate any representation
with clients if she is in violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct. In the situation above, the
attorney is confronted with a conflict of interest and she would violate Rule 16-107 if she represented
both the parent and the child.
84. If the parents' hire the attorney to represent both the parent and the child then under Model
Rule 16-102(A) the parents have the ultimate decision to discharge the attorney. See N.M. MODEL
RULaS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 16-102(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991). However, to avoid a confrontation between the attorney and the parents because the parents want to discharge the attorney
who was hired to represent the child, the attorney should make certain at the beginning of the
relationship that compensation from the parents is for the purpose of representing the child, and
any decisions made for the child is on behalf of his or her best interest.
85. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) and N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-017(c). Appointment of a guardian ad litem is made by a court in which the suit is pending. Written request
may be made by the minor if he or she is over fourteen. If the minor is under fifteen then the
request can come from a friend, any competent person, or the proposed guardian ad litem herself.
The request and consent of the guardian ad litem is filed in the clerk's office of the court. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-4-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). "The guardian ad litem so appearing in any action or
proceeding for and on behalf of an incapacitated person [or minor] shall have power to compromise
the same and to agree to the judgment to be entered therein for or against his ward, subject to
the approval of the court in which such suit is pending." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-4-16 (Repl. Pamp.
1987). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-303.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (allows a guardian ad litem to
be appointed by a judge for probate matters when in probate court); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27
(Repl. Pamp. 1989) (allows appointment of a guardian ad litem in children's court under the
Children's Code).
86. 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (1991).
87. Id. at 393, 806 P.2d at 43.
88. Id.
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The plaintiffs' attorney in the legal malpractice claim asserted that the
original attorney, representing both the injured child and the parents,
found himself in a conflict position when the settlement agreement was
being negotiated because defendants offered a lump sum settlement and
plaintiffs' attorney had to apportion it between the parents and the
child.8 9 The attorney arguably realized he could no longer represent both
the interests of the minor and the parent because he was not in a position
to determine how to divide the lump sum settlement offer between the
child and the parents. 90 As a result, a guardian ad litem was appointed
to represent the best interests of the minor.
These facts asserted by the plaintiffs were part of the Supreme Court's
consideration in determining the outcome of the legal malpractice case.
The court faced the issue of whether the guardian ad litem was acting
as an arm of the court with judicial immunity or as a private advocate
without judicial immunity. 9' The judgment was vacated and remanded
to the district court with instructions to determine whether the guardian
ad litem was acting on behalf of the court and entitled to immunity
from a malpractice claim.9 The case was settled before the district court
resolved the matter.
The choice to assign the claim for future medical expenses to the
parents or to the child in Lopez creates a potential conflict of interest
as did the lump sum settlement offer to the parents and child in Collins.
In either a Lopez or a Collins situation, if a guardian ad litem is appointed,
the child's guardian or private attorney may agree with the parents that
the parents should have the cause of action for future medical expenses.
If this is the outcome, then there is no conflict between the parents and
the child, speaking through the guardian ad litem, and the parents'
attorney should proceed with a suit in the name of the parents. However,
if the child's guardian ad litem determines that the child should recover
his or her own future medical expenses, then the impasse is not yet
resolved. Lopez neither contemplated this problem nor suggests a means
for resolution. To avoid any conflict between the parents and the guardian
ad litem over a cause of action for the child, the attorney should engage
the parents in objective and reasonable counseling at the point at which
an impasse over future medical expenses surfaces. The attorney has the
opportunity to foresee some of the problems that may affect her representation with parents in a tort claim, and to realize that effective
counseling with the parents as to the benefits of giving the cause of
action to the child may prevent ethical problems from arising and possibly
impairing the best interests of the injured child.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 399, 806 P.2d at 48.
Id.
Id. at 393, 806 P.2d at 43.
Id. at 405, 806 P.2d at 54.
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CONCLUSION

The court of appeals decision sought to give plaintiffs' attorneys and
families more flexibility in pursuing a personal injury claim for injuries
to a minor. The court broke from the traditional rule that parents alone
have the right to recover for the minor's future medical expenses and
gave either the parent or the child the right to claim such damages. The
ruling provides additional options for the attorney seeking to recover a
minor's future medical expenses and provides additional opportunities to
assure full compensation for the child, but the effect of the decision can
be to create a serious problem of conflict of interest which may be
harmful to the minor's best interests.
It may have been preferable had the court granted to the child alone
the cause of action for future medical expenses rather than providing
that either the parents or the child may pursue a claim. Requiring the
plaintiff's attorney to file the cause of action in the name of the child
would always result in the application of the longer statute of limitations,
would avoid difficult jury determinations of the future competency of
the child at age eighteen, and would be most likely to assure that the
proceeds were protected from the parents' creditors or parental mismanagement. 93 Most importantly, such a ruling would have avoided the
difficult conflict of interest and ethical problems that can now confront
the attorney who must decide whether to sue on behalf of the parents
or the child.
Having decided that the parents do not have the sole right to sue for
the child's future medical bills, the court might next consider whether
the best solution is to provide that the claim for future medical expenses
must in all cases be brought in the child's name.
JESSICA SUTIN

93. The one area that is not beneficial to a family if the cause of action is in the child's name
alone is recovery under the N.M. Tort Claims Act. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(2) & (3) (Repl.
Pamp. 1989). See supra part IV(4). Even this potential benefit from the right to choose between
the parents and the child may have been negated by the 1992 amendment to the Act; see N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Cum. Supp. 1992).

